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Prejudgment interest is interest a court awards to a plaintiff who
receives money damages in excess of any settlement offer made by a
defendant prior to trial.' Courts award prejudgment interest for two
basic reasons: (1) to compensate the aggrieved plaintiff fully,' and (2)
to alleviate congestion in the courts by encouraging prompt and equi-
table settlements.3 Courts consider the former rationale substantive
and the latter procedural.4 States characterize their prejudgment in-
terest rules according to whether they regard them as more substan-
tive or procedural, that is, geared more toward plaintiff compensation
or judicial economy.5 For example, some statutes contain offer-
counteroffer provisions and other procedural mechanisms, which sug-
gests that the legislatures designed them and courts interpreted them
mainly for purposes of judicial economy and control. Conversely,
t B.A. 1999, Brigham Young University; J.D. Candidate 2002,7The University of Chicago.
1 Laudenberger v Port Authority ofAllegheny County, 496 Pa 52,436 A2d 147,149 (1981).
2 See, for example, Simeone v First Bank NationalAssociation, 73 F3d 184,190-91 (8th Cir
1996) (stating that prejudgment interest is an element of damages that courts "award to provide
full compensation by converting time-of-demand damages into time-of-verdict damages"); Mar-
razzo v Scranton Nehi Bottling Co, 438 Pa 72,263 A2d 336,337 (1970) (stating that the award for
the time delay is in the form of interest and is thus merely an extension of the compensatory
damages necessary to make a plaintiff whole).
3 See, for example, Laudenberger, 436 A2d at 150-51 (explaining that the purposes of
Pennsylvania's prejudgment interest rule were to "encourage pre-trial settlement" and "alleviate
delay in the disposition of cases, thereby lessening congestion in the courts").
4 See, for example, id (comparing different courts' characterizations of their prejudgment
interest rules and explaining that every rule or law has some procedural and substantive compo-
nent, though a characterization is still useful to show the purpose for which a legislature or court
enacted the rule or to show the area in which the rule has the greatest effect).
5 For example, compare Yohannon v Keene Corp, 924 F2d 1255, 1264-67 (3d Cir 1991)
(arguing that even though courts can characterize prejudgment interest as substantive, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court structured the rule such that Pennsylvania courts could and should
characterize it as procedural), with Simeone, 73 F3d at 190-91 (stating that Minne-
sota's prejudgment interest rule is an element of damages to provide full compensation "by con-
verting time-of-demand damages into time-of-verdict damages" and is therefore substantive).
See also Morris v Watsco, Inc, 385 Mass 672,433 NE2d 886,890 n 7 (1982) (explaining that pre-
judgment interest laws may be more procedural or substantive depending on whether the calcu-
lation is ministerial or discretionary).
6 See, for example, Ohio Rev Code Ann § 1343.03 (West 1994 & Supp 1999) (conditioning
the interest award on a determination that the party required to pay failed to make a good faith
effort to settle, and that the party who will receive the payment did not fail to do so); Tex Fm
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other states have characterized their prejudgment interest rules pri-
marily as additional victim compensation.
Federal courts, however, unanimously construe prejudgment in-
terest rules as substantive under Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins be-
cause of their outcome-determinative nature. Thus, federal courts fol-
low the characterizations of the states in which they sit.9 This practice
by the federal courts has led to heightened vertical uniformity within
states. ' The increased vertical uniformity, coupled with states' differ-
ing characterizations of prejudgment interest along proce-
dural/substantive lines, exacerbates the lack of horizontal uniformity
that might have existed among federal courts across state lines." This
lack of uniformity across state lines has led to forum shopping, unpre-
dictability, and a lack of uniformity of outcomes in choice-of-law cases
because aamage awards from identical cases vary depending on the
state. 
2
This Comment proposes a solution to these problems by chal-
lenging the assumption that when courts characterize prejudgment in-
terest rules as procedural for choice-of-law purposes, they fulfill the
stated purposes of "unclogging the judicial machinery," "encourag[ing]
settlements," and "reducing the number of cases actually going to
Code Ann §§ 304.101-304.108 (West 1998) (including suspended periods for the accrual of inter-
est due to delays in the trial or during periods that an offer may be accepted). Thus, courts can
penalize plaintiffs and defendants for refusing to accept, or failing to offer, a reasonable settle-
ment offer. See also Laudenberger, 436 A2d at 150-55, in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
firmly established that its prejudgment rule's main purpose-control over both plaintiffs and de-
fendants-is procedural and thus courts should always construe it as a procedural rule, even
though it involves some substantive rights.
7 See, for example, Simeone, 73 F3d at 190-91 (noting that "[p]rejudgment interest is an
element of damages awarded to provide full compensation" to the plaintiff); Star Technologies;
Inc v Philips Medical Systems, NA, Inc, 23 Va App Cir 267,269 (1991) ("'The award of prejudg-
ment interest is to compensate plaintiff for the loss sustained by not receiving the amount to
which he was entitled at the time he was entitled to receive it."'), quoting Marks v Sanzo, 231 Va
350,345 SE2d 263,267 (1986).
8 304 US 64 (1938).
9 Laudenberger, 436 A2d at 152. See also Plantation Key Developers, Inc v Colonial Mort-
gage Co of Indiana, Inc, 589 F2d 164,170 (5th Cir 1979); Clissold v St. Louis-San Francisco Rail-
way Co, 600 F2d 35, 38-39 (6th Cir 1979); Glick v White Motor Co, 458 F2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir
1972) (stating that the unanimous federal rule regarding prejudgment interest is to follow the
state rules in which the federal court sits); In reAir Crash Disaster near Chicago, Illinois; on May
25,1979,480 F Supp 1280,1282 (N D Ill 1979), affd, 644 F2d 633 (7th Cir 1981).
10 Vertical uniformity refers to the uniform adjudication of cases within a particular state
while horizontal uniformity refers to the uniform adjudication of cases by courts across state
lines.
11 For example, federal law is said to be horizontally uniform because courts should apply
federal law in the same way as other federal courts regardless of the state in which the parties
brought the suit. Likewise, state criminal laws often lack horizontal uniformity because they dif-
fer from state to state. Therefore, because states characterize their laws differently and federal
courts follow Erie and its progeny to enforce vertical uniformity strictly, together these condi-
tions exacerbate horizontal uniformity.
12 See discussion in Parts II.C, III, and IVA.
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trial."'3 A procedural characterization, in the end, does just the oppo-
site.
Part I of this Comment describes what prejudgment interest is
and explains why different states characterize their prejudgment in-
terest rules as either procedural or substantive. Part II delineates the
current state of the law, showing how static interpretations of pre-
judgment interest statutes have led to differences between states.14
Part III offers an example to demonstrate how the problem can actu-
ally play out in the real world. Part IV argues that the proper under-
standing of the purpose behind procedurally characterized prejudg-
ment interest rules is dynamic judicial efficiency and case control. Part
IV then argues that the only way to fulfill this purpose is to interpret
prejudgment interest rules dynamically and thus to characterize them
as substantive for choice-of-law determinations. In conclusion, in or-
der to fulfill the procedural purposes of reducing forum shopping and
increasing settlements and judicial economy, courts need to consider
prejudgment interest effects dynamically.
I. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND THE
CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION
A. Prejudgment Interest
If justice were immediate, there would never be a need for an
award of prejudgment interest because the injured party would in-
stantly receive an enforceable judgment. The injured party would not
suffer time value of money losses due to delay of payment." Yet be-
cause justice often takes many years to achieve, the laws of most
13 Zaretsky v Molecular Biosystems Inc, 464 NW2d 546,550 (Minn App 1990) (explaining
the reasons behind characterizing prejudgment interest as procedural). This Comment focuses
solely on the use of prejudgment interest in choice-of-law situations where courts apply another
state's substantive law rather than their own. It does not consider how effective prejudgment in-
terest rules are or whether courts should consider them substantive or procedural for any other
purpose.
14 A static interpretation refers to a court's interpreting a rule or statute only in light of the
case at hand. A dynamic interpretation occurs when a court interprets a rule or statute in light of
the effect the ruling will have on the entire system and its future. Some statutes seem uniquely
static because their main effect is for plaintiff compensation or efficient discovery. Even these
rules, however, have dynamic components. How judges rule today may dictate future plaintiff
compensation and discovery because of its precedential value. Likewise, other statutes seem
uniquely dynamic in that they aim to protect the integrity of the court system, as opposed to in-
dividual parties in a suit.
15 Tune value of money refers to the general notion that money is worth more now than
later. This is based on the idea that we either get more enjoyment out of a comparable present
pleasure or that we can take current money and receive interest on it such that we will have
more money in the future. If justice were immediate, there would be no time for interest to ac-
crue. See, for example, Perry Drug Stores, Inc v Department of Treasury, 229 Mich App 453,582
N V2d 533,536 n 4 (1998) (stating that the time value of money refers to the concept that "a dol-
lar received today is worth more than a dollar to be received in the future").
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American jurisdictions provide that prejudgment interest be calcu-
lated for the period between the time of the wrong and the date of the
judgment.16 This interest is then added to the damage award. Thus, pre-
judgment interest pressures a defendant to settle if the plaintiff has a
strong case because if the defendant waits and the plaintiff wins at
least as much as the defendant offered the plaintiff as a settlement
then the defendant must pay interest on the full amount awarded.17
Prejudgment interest rules, which can be part of a state's civil
procedure rules or general statutes, vary significantly between states."
Some prejudgment interest rules are mandatory, usually requiring the
defendant to pay a percentage of the plaintiff's award, while others
give a range and leave the exact percentage to the discretion of the
trial judge.'9 The default percentage range is also quite large, beginning
at 5 percent and extending to 20 percent, though most states defer to
any contracted rate.n° For example, Illinois's statutory rate is 5 per-
cent,2' whereas Texas's statutory rate is variable up to 20 percent."
With a $1 million verdict, this translates to a $150,000 difference per
year, which could exert serious settlement pressure on the defendant.
This creates a large incentive for the plaintiff to forum shop, especially
given the fact that large civil trials rarely last less than a year.2 Thus,
prejudgment interest not only increases forum shopping and pressure
to settle quickly, but plaintiffs may be able to request more for settle-
ment because the extra burden of prejudgment interest is a credible
threat.
Historically, courts and legislatures have viewed prejudgment
interest as exploitative and thus an improper judicial remedy. Recent
trends in prejudgment interest law, however, suggest an increased will-
ingness by state courts and legislatures to impose prejudgment inter-
est.n Many states believe that courts need to be able to award pre-
judgment interest to expedite the resolution of disputes, help judges
16 See Prejudgment and Postjudgment Interest: A Fifty State Survey § 1 (Vedder Price 1996)
(comparing the prejudgment interest rules of all fifty states).
17 This is the general configuration of most states' prejudgment interest statutes. See id.
18 Interestingly, most prejudgment interest rules are statutes, not civil procedure rules. See
id.
19 See id.
20 See id. Note that because most states enforce any contractual rates set by the parties
these rates could theoretically be from 0 percent to 100 percent (or more), depending on the rate
in the contract.
21 815 ILCS § 205/2 (West 1998).
22 Tex Rev Civ Stat Ann articles 5069-1.03,5069-1.05 (West 2001).
23 See Theodore Eisenberg and Kevin M. Clermont, Federal District-Court Civil Trials Da-
tabase, available online at <http://teddy.law.corell.edu:8090/questtr2.htm> (visited Dec 7,2001)
(reporting average case duration, among other data).
24 See Charles L. Knapp, 1 Commercial Damages § 604[1] (Matthew Bender 1986).
25 See id at 6.04[2] (discussing the increased recognition of the importance of prejudgment
interest by state courts and legislatures).
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control their dockets, and compensate plaintiffs fully for their loss of
use of the judgment money.26
B. Substantive/Procedural Distinction
Courts frequently provide two justifications for the additional li-
ability of prejudgment interest: (1) the necessity to compensate
("make whole") the aggrieved plaintiff; and (2) the encouragement of
prompt and equitable settlements.2 Although state courts wiil often
defer to choice-of-law provisions when adjudicating the substantive is-
sues within a law,2 the law of the forum usually governs matters of
procedure.f The forum court decides whether to characterize given
laws as substantive or procedural.6 All courts recognize, however, that
prejudgment interest rules have both substantive and procedural fea-
tures, and that one rationale or the other may be more compelling de-
pending on the legal context.3 ' Rules granting prejudgment interest
inherently serve both substantive and procedural purposes: promoting
early settlement of claims and compensating the plaintiff for the in-
ability to utilize funds that were rightly due earlier.2
This is true regardless of whether the legislature or courts offi-
cially list prejudgment interest rules as procedural or substantive.-3
26 Prejudgment interest easily serves all three purposes, and courts cite any or all of these
purposes depending on the context. See, for example, Paine Webber Jackson and Curti4 Inc v
Winters, 22 Con App 640,579 A2d 545,553 (1990) (citing various purposes for prejudgment in-
terest); Laudenberger, 436 A2d at 150-55 (same).
27 See, for example, Royal Electric Construction Corp v Ohio State University, 73 Ohio St
3d 110, 652 NE2d 687,692 (1995) (noting that the state's prejudgment interest statute serves the
dual purpose of providing compensation and promoting early settlements); Rhode Island Turn-
pike & Bridge Authority v Bethlehem Steel Corp, 446 A2d 752,757 (RI 1982) (same).
28 See, for example, Stonewall Insurance Co v Argonaut Insurance Co, 75 F Supp 2d 893,
912 (N D Ill 1999) (looking first to the contract for a choice-of-law provision, but upon finding
none looking to Illinois choice-of-law rules to determine which state's law governs prejudgment
interest).
29 See, for example, Zaretsky v Molecular Biosystems Inc, 464 NW2d 546,548 (Minn App
1990) (stating the "well-settled rule ... that matters of procedure ... are governed by the law of
the forum," even though the court may be adjudicating the case under the substantive law of an-
other state).
30 Id, quoting Robert A. Leflar, Luther L. McDougal, II1, and Robert L. Felix, American
Conflicts Law § 121 at 333 (Michie 4th ed 1986) ("The court before which the question arises is
the one that has to decide whether any rule of law, domestic or foreign, will be characterized as
substantive or as procedural for choice-of-law purposes").
31 See, for example, Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 460, 471 (1965) ("The line between 'sub-
stance' and 'procedure' shifts as the legal context changes. 'Each implies different variables de-
pending upon the particular problem for which it is used."), quoting Guaranty Trust Co v York,
326 US 99, 108 (1945); Zaretsky, 464 NW2d at 548 (explaining that the substantive/procedural
line is slippery).
32 See Rhode Island Turnpike, 446 A2d at 757 (delineating the potential substantive and
procedural rationales for prejudgment interest statutes); Laudenberger v Port Authority of Alle-
gheny County, 496 Pa 52,436 A2d 147,150-51 (1981) (same).
33 See, for example, Zaretsky, 464 NW2d at 550 (holding that although prejudgment inter-
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Prejudgment interest does abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive
rights by increasing damage awards, but it also promotes settlement
and solves problems of congestion and delay, which are intrinsically
procedural goals.4
The Second Restatement states that prejudgment interest is sub-
stantive for choice-of-law decisions, and thus that the law of the state
under which the substantive legal issues are decided also "determines
whether plaintiff can recover interest, and, if so, the rate" at which it
may be recovered. 5 Courts, however, hotly contest the Second Re-
statement's substantive characterization."
C. The Second Restatement and Governmental Interest Analysis
Earlier choice-of-law rules based on territorial analysis, including
prejudgment interest, were relatively stable between 1834 (when Jus-
tice Story's treatise was published)' and 1962.33 Territorial analysis
meant determining the "rate of interest allowed as part of the dam-
ages ... by the law of the place of performance. '39 Courts applied this
rule by using the law where the parties performed (or were to per-
form) the contract, or where the tort occurred. ° In response to critics
and the multiple exceptions to the territorial rule, 4 the American Le-
est is a substantive remedy, the payment of such damages is an effect of the procedural purposes
of the statute, and therefore is procedural).
34 Compare Laudenberger, 436 A2d at 150-51 (stating that the state's prejudgment interest
rule "clearly reflects a primary desire to encourage pre-trial settlement"), and Zaretsky, 464
NW2d at 548-50 (stating that the primary goal of the statute was "the procedural aim of unclog-
ging the judicial machinery"), with Morris v Watsco, Inc, 385 Mass 672, 433 NE2d 886, 888-90
(1982) (describing these damages substantively as "a defendant's interest obligations," and a
"plaintiff's right to interest as damages").
35 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 207 comment e (1971). See also Amoco
Rocmount Co vAnschutz Corp,7 F3d 909,920 (10th Cir 1993) (discussing comment e).
36 See note 5.
37 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (Hilliard, Gray 1834).
38 See Patrick 3. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some Observations
and an Empirical Note, 56 Md L Rev 1232,1232-33 (1997) (stating that the "conflicts revolution"
began with the decision in Babcock v Jackson, 12 NY2d 473,191 NE2d 279,282 (1963)). Stability
only indicates the lack of major changes, not that the policies were necessarily the best. A court
first applied the Restatement (Second) in 1962, even though the ALI did not officially finish the
Restatement (Second) until 1969. See Babcock, 191 NE2d at 282 (applying the Second Restate-
ment's choice-of-law analysis).
39 Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 418 (1934).
40 See, for example, Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co v Kansas City Southern
Railway Co, 73 F Supp 2d 1274,1283 & n 3 (D Kan 1999) (analyzing and comparing the different
outcomes possible under the First and Second Restatements' applications of prejudgment inter-
est, but following the First Restatement's approach).
41 See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 Harv L Rev 173,180
(1933) (comparing the traditional methodology to a slot-machine that was programmed to select
the applicable law in a "blindfold" fashion, based solely on territorial contacts and without re-
gard to the content of the implicated laws). But see Erin A. O'Hara and Larry E. Ribstein, From
Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U Chi L Rev 1151,1184 (2000) (arguing that the First
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gal Institute began drafting its Second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws in 1952 and finished it in 1969.'
The ALI based the Second Restatement more on governmental
interest than territorial contacts. Governmental interest analysis leads
courts to interpret statutes and procedural rules in light of the gov-
ernmental need they are supposed to fill. Though the Second Re-
statement specifically characterizes prejudgment interest as substan-
tive,'* governmental analysis has led many states to characterize their
prejudgment interest statutes as procedural because of a focus on the
settlement and judicial economy aspects of prejudgment interest." At
least half of the states follow the Second Restatement's view that pre-
judgment interest is substantive, ' even if their rules originated from
different sources." Therefore, the Second Restatement's addition of in-
terest analysis to states' decisionmaking arsenals, coupled with its de-
termination that prejudgment interest be considered substantive, has
led to a divergence among the states in the characterization of pre-
judgment interest.
Restatement's territorial analysis is "most likely to lead to efficient results because its clear rules
promote predictability").
42 See W. Noel Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and a Proposal for
Its Amelioration, 13 Pepperdine L Rev 23,37-41 (1985) (laying out the history of the Second Re-
statement); Willis L. M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 L & Contemp
Probs 679,680-81 (1963) (same).
43 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 207 comment e.
44 See, for example, Laudenberger v Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa 52, 436
A2d 147, 150-51 (1981) (focusing solely on the procedural aspects of Pennsylvania's prejudg-
ment interest rule while admitting that it has substantive aspects).
45 See Symeon C Symeonides, The JudicialAcceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement:
A Mixed Blessing, 56 Md L Rev 1248,1264-69 (1997) (listing twenty-one jurisdictions that follow
the Second Restatement in tort conflicts, twenty-five jurisdictions that follow it in contracts con-
flicts, twenty-eight jurisdictions that follow a "significant contacts" approach to conflicts in torts,
and thirty that do so in contracts, and still additional jurisdictions that follow a "mixed" ap-
proach, relying partly on the Second Restatement in torts (six states) and contracts (ten states)).
See also Cooper v Ross & Robert; Inc, 505 A2d 1305, 1307 (Del Super 1986) (stating that the
majority view among states is that "prejudgment interest, like the issue of damages, is substan-
tive, and the state whose laws govern the substantive legal questions also governs the question of
prejudgment interest").
46 See, for example, Sorrels Steel Co, Inc v Great Southwest Corp, 906 F2d 158,167-68 (5th
Cir 1990) (stating that the law chosen in the contract should govern prejudgment interest, pro-
vided that "the state law selected bears a reasonable relation to the transaction"), quoting FMC
Finance Corp v Murphree, 632 F2d 413,418 (5th Cir 1980). Only a handful of courts have fully
endorsed the Second Restatement. See, for example, Emerson Electric Co v Crawford & Co, 963
SW2d 268,272 (Mo App 1997); Wang LaboratorieS Inc v Lee, 1989 Del Super LEXIS 173, *14-
15; Morris v Watsco, Inc, 385 Mass 672,433 NE2d 886,889-90 (1982). But see Schulhof v North-
east Cellulos4 Inc, 545 F Supp 1200,1211 (D Mass 1982) (noting that although cases have fully
endorsed the Second Restatement in transportation contracts, "it is not clear whether the law
governing prejudgment interest automatically would follow that governing substantive issues
under Morris v Watsco, Mc").
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II. CURRENT STATE OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST LAW
A. Federal Courts
Federal courts sitting in diversity and applying state law have re-
solved the procedural/substantive debate by choosing to use the pre-
judgment interest rule of the state in which they sit, not any federal
rule. These federal courts reason that, under the Erie doctrine,4' state
prejudgment interest rules concern substantive rights of the parties,
and thus the state prejudgment interest law applies. 9 Federal courts
usually rely on the Supreme Court's ruling in Klaxon Co v Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co, Incn for the proposition that a "federal
court sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the state in
which it sits, including that state's choice-of-law rules."" The Klaxon
Court, ruling that on issues of pre- and postjudgment interest state
and federal courts should be in harmony, disallowed federal courts
47 See American Anodco, Inc v Reynolds Metals Co, 743 F2d 417,425 (6th Cir 1984) ("In
diversity cases, federal courts follow state law on the question of prejudgment interest."). See
also Klaxon Co v Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co, Inc, 313 US 487,496 (1941) (holding that a
federal court sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits, in-
cluding that state's choice-of-law rules). Accordingly, federal courts have few rules regarding the
conflict of laws, and those are used in federal jurisdiction cases only. See Maddox v American
Airlines Inc, 115 F Supp 2d 993,995-96 (E D Ark 2000) (holding that since Arkansas was the fo-
rum in which the case was brought, the court must look to Arkansas's rules, which point to apply-
ing Oklahoma's prejudgment interest laws, but since Oklahoma characterizes prejudgment in-
terest as procedural, Arkansas's choice-of-law rules dictate that the court should award no pre-
judgment interest). The Maddox court applied no form of federal prejudgment interest. Id. But
when a district court sits in federal question jurisdiction, prejudgment interest has been deter-
mined by federal common law. See, for example, Robinson v Watts Detective Agency, Inc, 685 F2d
729,741 (1st Cir 1982) (applying the federal prejudgment interest rule because the case involved
no state law). Notwithstanding, if the underlying federal law is silent as to awarding prejudgment
interest, a court may look to state law. See Colon Velez v Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc,
957 F2d 933, 941 (1st Cir 1992) (applying the state prejudgment interest rule in a purely federal
case).
48 See 304 US at 71-79 (holding that a federal court sitting under diversity jurisdiction
must apply the law of the forum state to questions that are "substantive" but should use federal
rules to govern questions that are "procedural"); Simmons v Allstate Insurance Co, 1997 US Dist
LEXIS 10793, *3 (E D Pa) (applying Erie in prejudgment interest context). In Klaxon, 313 US at
487, the Supreme Court held that rules for ascertaining damages are "matters of substance" for
Erie purposes. Likewise, in Yohannon v Keene Corp, 924 F2d 1255, 1267 (3d Cir 1991), the Third
Circuit determined that prejudgment interest rules were "matters of substance" as far as Erie is
concerned, following Klaxon's damage ruling. Thus, federal courts sitting in diversity must exam-
ine prejudgment interest according to the state's laws in which they sit. See Klaxon, 313 US at
496. As with many issues, the problem is that prejudgment interest is somewhat "substantive" in
that it is outcome-determinative. On choice-of-law issues, "all of the labels in Erie and its prog-
eny seem to become logically non-determinative." Yohannon, 924 F2d at 1265.
49 See note 62;
50 313 US 487 (1941).
51 Id at 495-97. See also, Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co v Kansas City
Southern Railway Co, 73 F Supp 2d 1274, 1283 (D Kan 1999) (applying Kansas's choice-of-law
rules because that is where the court sits, even though the contract had a choice-of-law provision
for Missouri law).
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from making choice-of-law determinations that were independent of
rulings from the states in which they sit.2 The Supreme Court based its
ruling on Erie concerns: "Otherwise, the accident of diversity of citi-
zenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in co-
ordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side."'n Klaxon and
Erie thus created vertical uniformity between federal and state courts
within each state for choice-of-law and pre- and postjudgment interest
decisions. ' The Supreme Court in Klaxon recognized, however, that its
decision might exacerbate the lack of horizontal uniformity that had
resulted from differing administration of justice between states.5
B. State Courts
Not all states have authoritatively established whether their pre-
judgment interest rules are procedural or substantive.! In those "un-
decided" states, federal courts guess how they think state supreme
courts will rule or certify the question directly to the state supreme
courts.n
52 313 US at 495-97.
53 Id at 496. See also Erie, 304 US at 74-77.
54 Curran v Kwon, 153 F3d 481,488 (7th Cir 1998) ("A district court exercising jurisdiction
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties must apply the choice of law rules of the
state in which it sits."). See also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 207 comment e
(stating that the issue of prejudgment interest is substantive, and thus the law of the state under
which the substantive legal issues were decided also "determines whether plaintiff can recover
interest, and, if so, the rate"). Federal courts first look to how the state in which they sit would
rule when faced with a choice-of-law provision. See, for example, Burlington Northern, 73 F Supp
2d at 1283 (stating that since the court sits in Kansas, it "looks to Kansas choice of law rules to
determine which state's law governs"); Maddox, 115 F Supp 2d at 994-95 (stating that since the
plaintiff commenced the case in Arkansas, Arkansas was the forum and its choice-of-law rules
would govern).
55 313 US at 496 (acknowledging that its ruling would hurt uniformity among federal
courts by stating that "[w]hatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in
different states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits
permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its
neighbors"). Apparently, this is the price we pay for the benefits of our federal system. See also
International Insurance Co v Stonewall Insurance Co, 86 F3d 601,604-07 (6th Cir 1996) (discuss-
ing the dramatic differences in liability and prejudgment interest damages when adjudicating a
tort claim under Ohio versus Louisiana law).
56 See, for example, Contract Lodging Corp v Union Pacific Railroad, 1991 US Dist LEXIS
18663, *8 (D Kan) (stating that "it is not clear whether Kansas considers prejudgment interest to
be a matter of substantive or procedural law").
57 See, for example, Alaska Airlines; Inc v United Airlines, Inc, 902 F2d 1400,1404-05 (9th
Cir 1990) (certifying to the state supreme court the question of whether prejudgment interest is
of such vital public policy importance that it can override a choice of law provision); Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co v Kansas City Southern Railway Co, 73 F Supp 2d 1274,1283
(D Kan 1999) (determining that there was no authority in the Kansas court "resolving the issue
as to what law governs the allowance of prejudgment interest as an element of damages for the
breach of a contract" and thus trying to divine what Kansas courts would do based on other
precedents).
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1. Substantive prejudgment interest and the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.
The Restatement has embraced contractual choice-of-law clauses
as a method for determining the substantive law to be applied to dis-
putes between two parties.! The Restatement's position on interest as
applied to a judgment for damages is straightforward and likely to
promote certainty among parties to a contract: "The local law of the
state selected by application of the rule of this Section determines
whether plaintiff can recover interest, and, if so, the rate, upon dam-
ages awarded him for the period between the breach of contract and
the rendition of judgment."9 Thus, the Restatement argues that the
substantive law which the parties to a contract chose or which the
court applies to the parties under the "most significant relationship"
test determines if prejudgment interest will be awarded in the case,
and if so, how much." Many states follow this reasoning and apply the
chosen state's prejudgment interest rules because the law significantly
affects the parties' substantive rights.61 These states generally reason
along Erie grounds: substantive prejudgment interest results in uni-
form outcomes for uniform cases, reduces forum shopping, and fulfills
58 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (stating that a court should rely on
the law chosen by parties to adjudicate disputes sounding in contract; carving out two exceptions
related to offensiveness to public policy and the minimum contacts with the selected jurisdic-
tion).
59 Id at § 207 comment e.
60 See Johnson v ContinentalAirlines Corp, 964 F2d 1059,1063-64 (10th Cir 1992) (holding
that prejudgment interest is "an integral element of compensatory damages [and] is not subject
to an independent choice-of-law analysis"); Morris v Watsco, Inc, 385 Mass 672,433 NE2d 886,
890 (1982) (holding that "even where the parties have not agreed on the law which governs their
rights, the better rule may be in all instances to turn to the law governing rights and duties under
the contract to determine the interest payable for breach of contract"). But see Burlington
Northern, 73 F Supp 2d at 1283 (applying Kansas's choice-of-law rules because that is where the
court sits, even though the contract had a choice-of-law provision for Missouri law, on the
grounds that "[a] federal court sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the state in
which it sits, including that state's choice-of-law rules"); Yohannon v Keene Corp, 924 F2d 1255,
1264 (3d Cir 1991) (applying Pennsylvania's prejudgment interest rule because it is procedural
even though the ccnrt decided the case under New Jersey law).
61 See, for example, International Insurance Co v Stonewall Insurance Co, 86 F3d 601,604
(6th Cir 1996) ("Ohio has adopted the test set forth in the Restatement Second."); Sorrels Steel
Co, Inc v Great Southwest Corp, 906 F2d 158,167-68 (5th Cir 1990) ("Under Mississippi choice
of law principles, a choice of law provision in a contract will govern the issue of prejudgment in-
terest."); Star Technologies v Philips Medical Systems, NA, Inc, 23 Va App Cir 267, 269 (1991)
(noting that, in Virginia, prejudgment interest serves to compensate the plaintiff and is therefore
substantive); Cooper v Ross & Roberts, Inc, 505 A2d 1305, 1307 (Del Super 1986) (holding that
"the state whose laws govern the substantive legal questions also govern the questions of pre-
judgment interest"). The majority view among states is that "prejudgment interest, like the issue
of damages, is substantive, and the state whose laws govern the substantive legal questions also
governs the question of prejudgment interest." Id. See also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 207 comment e; note 51.
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the parties' expectations.2 Thus, these states think that the Second Re-
statement's position will "result in uniform interest payments, without
regard to the [state or federal] forum selected."6 The Massachusetts
Supreme Court in Morris v Watsco, Inc" gave another reason for ap-
plying a substantive prejudgment interest rule to parties in contract: it
accords with the parties' intent.65 Some courts, however, are reluctant
to follow the reasoning in Morris,' especially because Comment C to
§ 207 of the Restatement states that protecting the justified expecta-
tions of the parties "has little role to play with respect to the measure
of damages."67
The courts that characterize prejudgment interest as substantive
also generally defer to the state law chosen by the parties if they have
specifically detailed prejudgment interest in the contract; otherwise
they will look to the choice-of-law rules in the forum state to deter-
mine the availability of prejudgment interest.4 This accords with par-
ties' intentions and should not disrupt the adjudicating court.9
2. Procedural prejudgment interest.
At the other end of the spectrum are states that characterize their
prejudgment interest laws as procedural, regardless of whether they
are civil procedure rules (generally promulgated by the supreme court
of the respective state) or substantive laws.0 Although state courts will
62 See, for example, Morris, 433 NE2d at 889-90 (noting that adjudicating all rights accord-
ing to the substantive law chosen by the parties would decrease forum shopping and would result
in uniform treatment regardless of the court or state chosen).
63 Id at 890 (arguing that "the better rule ... in all instances [is] to turn to the law govern-
ing rights and duties under the contract to determine the interest payable for breach of con-
tract").
64 385 Mass 672,433 NE2d 886 (1982).
65 Id at 889 (stating that "the parties to the contract involved ... intended that their rights
should be determined by Florida law and that those rights include the determination of the dam-
ages, including interest, to be paid as a consequence of a breach of contract").
66 See, for example, Schulhof v Northeast Cellulose Inc, 545 F Supp 1200, 1211 (D Mass
1982) (asking the parties to brief the court regarding "the law governing prejudgment interest"
for later judgment because keeping with the parties' intentions was not sufficient justification for
using the laws from the state which supplied the substantive law).
67 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 207 comment c.
63 See, for example, Mobilificio San Giacomo SpA v Stoffi, 1998 WL 125536, *11 (D Del)
(looking to the "law of the forum state for determining the availability of prejudgment interest"
in a diversity case because the parties' agreement did not provide for prejudgment interest).
69 See id (implying that the court was simply following the parties' ex-ante intentions).
70 If a law is in the civil rules of procedure, rather than among substantive statutes, it may
be telling for an analysis of whether it is procedural or substantive, but it is not determinative.
See Busik v Levine, 63 NJ 351,307 A2d 571,577-79 (1973). As the New Jersey Supreme Court
noted in Busik, "[I]t is simplistic to assume that all law is divided neatly between 'substance' and
'procedure.' A rule of procedure may have an impact upon the substantive result and be no less a
rule of procedure on that account." Id at 578. Compare Zaretsky v Molecular Biosystems Inc, 464
NW2d 546, 550 (Minn App 1990) (holding the Minnesota prejudgment interest statute proce-
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often defer to contractual choice-of-law clauses when adjudicating the
substantive issues within a law, courts have an incentive to make the
prejudgment interest rule procedural because the law of the forum
state usually governs matters of procedure.7' Likewise, all courts rec-
ognize that prejudgment interest rules have both substantive and pro-
cedural features, and one rationale or the other may be more compel-
ling depending on the legal context.7
Emphasis on the settlement and judicial economy functions of
prejudgment interest, coupled with governmental interest analysis, has
caused some state courts to characterize prejudgment interest as a
component of procedural law. For example, in Paine Webber Jackson
and Curtis, Inc v Winters, 7 a Connecticut appellate court explicitly re-
jected the Second Restatement as applied to the state statute on pre-
judgment interest, ruling that "interest awarded under § 52-192a is un-
related to the underlying debt.",5 The court stated that prejudgment
interest in Connecticut "is solely related to a defendant's rejection of
an advantageous offer to settle before trial and his subsequent waste
dural because it "is a substantive remedy for a new, litigant's wrong"), with Maddox v American
Airlines Inc, 115 F Supp 2d 993,995 (E D Ark 2000) (holding in a diversity case brought in Ar-
kansas that since Oklahoma's prejudgment interest statute is procedural, the court would apply
no prejudgment interest), and Paine Webber Jackson and CurtiS Inc v Winters, 22 Conn App 640,
579 A2d 545, 551 (1990) (noting that New York has two prejudgment interest rules: one New
York courts regard as substantive, and another they regard as procedural). Compare also Yohan-
non v Keene Corp, 924 F2d 1255,1265-67 (3d Cir 1991) (holding that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court created Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the
award of prejudgment interest or "delay damages" in tort cases, to "encourage settlements and
reduce a severe backlog of civil cases sounding in tort"; therefore it is procedural and courts
should apply it in tort cases, even if the court applies another state's law on issues of liability and
basic damages).
71 See, for example, Zaretsky, 464 NW2d at 548 ("[Tlhe well-settled rule is that matters of
procedure and remedies are governed by the law of the forum.").
72 See, for example, id ("[T]he line between 'substance' and 'procedure' shifts as the legal
context changes. Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for
which it is used."), quoting Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 460,471 (1965).
73 See, for example, Zaretsky, 464 NW2d at 550-51 (claiming that a prejudgment interest
award is a substantive remedy for a new, litigant's wrong, which is inherently a matter for the
state in which the parties are litigating the contract dispute); Laudenberger v Port Authority of
Allegheny County, 496 Pa 52,436 A2d 147,150-51 (claiming that the Pennsylvania prejudgment
interest rule was more procedural than substantive in response to a state constitutional claim
that the prejudgment interest rule promulgated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court under their
authbrity to make procedural rules was unconstitutional because it was really a rule of substance
in disguise). Both courts noted the possibly substantive nature of prejudgment interest rules. Be-
cause the Pennsylvania Supreme Court itself promulgates procedural rules, it amended the
Pennsylvania prejudgment rule (Rule 238) to correct any potential constitutional problems that
could possibly be found in the original version because the original version had a strict applica-
tion against defendants whose actions had no relation to any delay in payment. See Craig v
Magee Memorial Rehabilitation Center, 512 Pa 60,515 A2d 1350,1352-53 (1986) (discussing the
changes that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made to Rule 238).
74 579 A2d 545 (1990).
75 Id at 552.
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of judicial resources."76 The Paine Webber court also rejected an earlier
ruling by a federal district court in Connecticut that the same statute
was substantive.n According to the Paine Webber court, an analysis of
the substantive/procedural distinction can vary depending on whether
the two jurisdictions are state and federal as opposed to state and
state, implying that more things are substantive for Erie purposes than
for the forum state's procedural purposes.n
C. Summary: Horizontal Disuniformity
The combination of all these factors-state courts' differing char-
acterizations of prejudgment interest, the different amounts and rea-
sons for which courts award prejudgment interest in different states,
and Klaxon's further whittling away of any horizontal uniformity
among federal courts in different states--has led to drastic differences
in the outcomes available to plaintiffs depending on the state in which
they bring their suits." These are similar problems to those that the
Supreme Court in Erie tried to avoid: forum shopping and different
outcomes depending on the court in which the case is brought.8" In all
fairness, the Supreme Court minimized these concerns vertically be-
tween state and federal courts within the same state by mandating
that the "substantive" law be the same.8' But the United States's econ-
76 Id. See also Zaretsky, 464 NW2d at 549-50 (agreeing with the lower court's determina-
tion that features of prejudgment interest law were "more procedural than substantive"); Fields
v Volkswagen of America, Inc, 1976 Okla 106,555 P2d 48,63 (1976) (ruling that a statute pertain-
ing to interest on judgments is "procedural rather than substantive" and therefore courts can ap-
ply it retroactively).
77 579 A2d at 552-53 (holding that Connecticut's prejudgment interest statute "clearly cre-
ates a substantive statutory right in persons suing in the Connecticut courts"), distinguishing
Frenette v Vickery, 522 F Supp 1098, 1099 (D Conn 1981). See also Laudenberger, 436 A2d at
154-55 (ruling that the prejudgment interest rule is procedural enough to justify the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court's propagating it under its delegated authority to establish procedural
rules).
78 579 A2d at 552-53 (noting that the court in Frenette clearly limited its ruling to the "Erie
context"). Thus, federal courts in these contexts generally do two analyses: first, they decide
whether a certain rule is "substantive" for Erie purposes, and then they decide whether the rule
is "substantive" for choice-of-law purposes according to how the state in which they sit would
decide the issue. See Simmons v Allstate Insurance Co, 1997 US Dist LEXIS 10793, *3-5 (E D
Pa) (holding that even though prejudgment interest is substantive for Erie purposes, it is a pro-
cedural rule in Pennsylvania, so a federal court should apply Pennsylvania prejudgment interest
even though the parties are adjudicating the case under New Jersey law).
79 Compare, for example, the outcomes in Maddox v American Airlines, Inc, 115 F Supp 2d
993, 996 (E D Ark 2000), in which the plaintiff received no prejudgment interest (because of a
combination of prejudgment interest rules, states' characterization of such, and the court's inter-
pretation of its duty to look to state law under Klaxon), with the possibility of two different ap-
plicable state rules in Paine Webber, 579 A2d at 551-52 (stating that if prejudgment interest is not
discretionary under either statute or for discretionary reasons "both statutes could apply").
80 304 US at 75-76.
81 See Klaxon, 313 US at 496 (stating that federal courts should apply state law for any-
thing that "would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and fed-
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omy and mobility are such that the cost of bringing a lawsuit in an-
other state may not be too much greater, and with possibilities of a
much greater recovery or a quicker settlement, the benefits may easily
outweigh the inconvenience and cost. The Supreme Court in Klaxon
did not solve the game of forum shopping or different outcomes; it
just changed the rules of the game.8 In creating this vertical uniform-
ity, the Supreme Court disrupted any horizontal uniformity that might
have existed among federal courts and simply switched forums for fo-
rum shopping: plaintiffs now decide between states.8 Because state
laws differ, whenever the Supreme Court forces federal courts into be-
ing more like state courts (vertical uniformity), courts across state
boundaries become more divergent (horizontal uniformity).
Choice-of-law clauses in contracts and conflict of laws rules in
states do not bring certainty as to how a case will be decided. The
Klaxon rule forcing federal courts to follow the choice-of-law rules of
the states in which they sit may have added some certainty between
state and federal courts in the same state, but this certainty came at
the cost of shifting the uncertainty to another forum. Plaintiffs still
have roughly the same opportunity to choose favorable prejudgment
interest law between different states (either state or federal courts) as
they did between federal and state courts in the same state before
Erie.? Because prejudgment interest can comprise large sums of
eral courts sitting side by side"). Later holdings were not this strong and have somewhat whittled
down this principle. See, for example, Stewart Organization, Inc v Ricoh Corp, 487 US 22,28-32
(1988) (allowing some differences in quasi-substantive laws between state and federal courts sit-
ting in the same state); Burlington Northern Railroad Co v Woods, 480 US 1, 8 (1987) (holding
that a federal rule controlled the manner of imposing penalties because the procedural rule "af-
fects only the process of enforcing litigants rights and not the rights themselves"); Walker v
Armco Steel Corp, 446 US 740,751-52 (1980) (stating that "there is no direct conflict between
the Federal Rule and the state law," and therefore each rule controls "its own intended sphere of
coverage"); Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 460, 473-74 (1965) (holding that a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure was valid and controlling when in conflict with a state rule).
82 Instead of choosing between federal or state courts within the same states, plaintiffs and
defendants now choose between states. See Joseph W. Glannon, Civil Procedure 187-89 (Aspen
3d ed 1997) (giving examples to show how plaintiffs can still forum shop between states).
83 See text accompanying note 55 for the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that Erie and
Klaxon would lead to horizontal disuniformity.
84 As long as state laws regarding prejudgment interest are different, forcing vertical uni-
formity must exacerbate the lack of horizontal uniformity between federal courts because they
will essentially be applying the law of the state in which they sit. The only way to really combat
this problem is to allow a uniform federal prejudgment interest rule or a uniform state prejudg-
ment interest rule, such as that proposed by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 207
comment e, which would have all courts decide prejudgment interest according to the state's law
under which the parties are adjudicating the contract or dispute.
85 The main point of Erie and Klaxon was to rid our system of forum shopping and differ-
ent outcomes among courts sitting right next to each other in the same state. The Supreme Court
in Klaxon, 313 US at 496, argued that the prohibition in Erie "against such independent determi-
nations by the federal courts, extends to the field of conflicts of laws ... [o]therwise, the accident
of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate
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money, 6 differences between how states apply prejudgment interest
rules may have a large impact on where many plaintiffs take their
cases."' Plaintiffs trying to maximize their damages and settlement
pressure logically will choose a state with a procedural prejudgment
interest rule, and hope that the substantive law comes from a state
with a substantive prejudgment interest rule.7
Note that this outcome may actually hurt those states that rely on
their procedural rules, such as prejudgment interest, to decrease the
demand on their court system: plaintiffs, when possible, will choose
these states over their substantive sisters.89 Thus, even though courts in
their own states should be able to set the rules that promote early set-
tlement of claims and make for more efficient courthouses, it appears
that differences in prejudgment interest characterization may bring
more uncertainty into our system, subvert parties' expectations, allow
forum shopping and disparate outcomes, and end up hurting those
states that are trying to protect themselves.
III. HORIZONTAL DIsuNIFORMTY AND FORUM
SHOPPING ILLUSTRATED
The following example shows how different characterizations of
prejudgment interest encourage forum shopping and other problems
that Erie tried to avoid: Two businesses, II and A, make a contract with
state and federal courts sitting side by side." This will inevitably eliminate some forum shopping
and make it a bit more costly. Notwithstanding, many people and businesses have sufficient con-
tacts in many states for jurisdiction and many major cities are located near state borders. Like-
wise, courts still give dramatically different rulings even though they sit "side by side" just be-
cause they are in different states. The Northeast and cities such as Kansas City are most suscep-
tible to the "easy" forum shopping that Erie and its progeny tried to rid from our system. See
also examples in Glannon, Civil Procedure at 189-202 (cited in note 82).
86 A brief survey of the variability of prejudgment interest statutes on the state level
strongly suggests that calculations of this additional liability, holding the substantive law con-
stant, can vary significantly. See Prejudgment and Postjudgment Interest § 1 (cited in note 16).
When the parties or the court prolong the pretrial phase and the monetary stakes are high, a so-
phisticated defendant could rely on a declaratory judgment action to secure a forum that could
ultimately limit the defendant's liability. Likewise, plaintiffs would certainly be interested in se-
lecting a forum that can augment orpreserve the value of a favorable judgment, assuming the is-
sue of prejudgment interest was not a factor in the original choice-of-law clause.
87 See text accompanying notes 21-24.
88 This strategy could backfire, however, due to courts' general dislike for exploitation of
the court system. See, for example, Portwood v Ford Motor Co, 183 Ill 2d 459,701 NE2d 1102,
1104 (1998) (rejecting a rule of crossjurisdictional class action tolling because of the potential for
exploitation of the Illinois court system).
s9 The court in Laudenberger v Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa 52, 436 A2d
147, 150-51 (1981), explicitly held that Pennsylvania's prejudgment interest rule is procedural
because the court intended it to "encourage pre-trial settlement" and "alleviate delay in the dis-
position of cases, thereby lessening congestion in the courts." Nonetheless, this policy may back-
fire if plaintiffs disproportionately choose Pennsylvania when the benefits of doing so outweigh
the costs of adjudication in a more convenient state.
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a choice-of-law provision stating that any adjudication will be done
under Connecticut law regardless of who brings the case and where.
Both businesses have sufficient contacts in at least three states for ju-
risdictional purposes: New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey. Never-
theless, the state courts differ in their characterizations of prejudg-
ment interest: Connecticut's is procedural, New York has both a sub-
stantive and procedural prejudgment interest rule (though the proce-
dural prejudgment rule is discretionary and courts generally do not
apply it when they utilize the substantive rule), and New Jersey's is
substantive.9
A year after the parties form the contract, 1 thinks that A is not
fulfilling the obligations of the bargain, so 11 desires to take A to court
for breach of contract. The outcome probably will be different in each
state. If l believes that there is a good chance that a prejudgment in-
terest rule will either force early settlement or provide additional
compensation if fl wins, in which state should 1l bring the case? If 1
brings the case in Connecticut, the state or federal court will, of
course, use Connecticut law to adjudicate everything, including its
procedural prejudgment interest rule. This is the normal, but uninter-
esting, case that the parties intended."
If fi brings the case in New Jersey, however, 1 loses the benefit of
any prejudgment interest rule. New Jersey will apply the substantive
law chosen by the contract (Connecticut's) and its own procedural
rules, which do not include prejudgment interest. New Jersey would
look to Connecticut's laws for a prejudgment interest rule, but would
most likely not award any prejudgment interest upon finding that
Connecticut courts characterize their prejudgment interest rule as
procedural.' This hurts 1I, helps A, and most likely subverts the inten-
90 Though simplified, this example roughly follows Connecticut, New York, and New Jer-
sey's prejudgment interest rules. Compare Paine Webber, 579 A2d at 550-52 (ruling that Con-
necticut's offer of judgment rule is procedural and courts should apply it despite a determination
that another state's law governs substantive issues; also noting that New York has two prejudg-
ment interest rules: 52-192a, which New York regards as procedural because it provides an eco-
nomic incentive for parties to settle disputes before trial, and CPLR § 5001, which New York re-
gards as substantive), with Busik v Levine, 63 NJ 351, 307 A2d 571,580 (1973) (stating in a plu-
rality opinion that "in the context of conflict of laws,... 'damages' go to the substance" in New
Jersey). Paine Webber, 579 A2d at 552, noted that in appropriate cases both Connecticut and
New York's prejudgment rules could apply: "The defendant could owe interest as damages on
the debt and then owe interest on the total amount based on his refusal to settle."
91 If our.goal as a society is to maximize social utility, we should construct a rule under
which the intended outcome will occur most often. See O'Hara and Ribstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at
1152 (cited in note 41) (arguing that the most efficient choice-of-law system would fulfill parties'
intents, thus maximizing parties' joint welfare).
92 For an example of this result, see Maddox v American Airlines, Inc, 115 F Supp 2d 993,
995-96 (E D Ark 2000) (ruling that no prejudgment interest would apply to the damage award
because Oklahoma characterizes its prejudgment interest rule as procedural and Arkansas does
not have an applicable procedural rule).
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tions of the contract in favor of A. Thus, if prejudgment interest is sig-
nificant enough to Wake a difference in the case, Il will not rationally
choose New Jersey. It is possible that A may be able to move the case
to New Jersey by way of venue and thus thwart any possibility of pre-
judgment interest, depending on whether the referring court consid-
ered prejudgment interest "outcome determinative."
Finally, if 11 brings the suit in New York, 1 will have the benefit of
that state's procedural prejudgment interest rule. Nonetheless, bring-
ing the case in New York may still subvert the intentions of the parties
because the rate of interest and the date from which it accrues often
differ dramatically between states.5 To summarize, if the case is
brought in Connecticut, the court will adhere to the parties' expecta-
tions, in New Jersey, it will thwart the parties' expectations, and in
New York, the court will fulfill or thwart the parties' intentions de-
pending on how similar New York's prejudgment interest rule is to
Connecticut's.9'
Changing the hypothetical slightly, however, can easily cause a
windfall for 11. Assume the same facts as above, except that this time
the contract lists New Jersey's as the state law under which the con-
tract should be decided. If IT brings the suit in a New Jersey court, the
court will apply New Jersey law, corresponding to the parties' expecta-
tions. On the other hand, if I brings the case in Connecticut, A may
feel the pressure of both New Jersey's substantive prejudgment rule
93 Prejudgment interest is important for at least two reasons. First, plaintiffs' potential up-
side on 5-20 percent interest on any sizeable judgment will be quite large. Second, states and
courts obviously believe that the imposition of prejudgment interest will serve as a sufficient
economic incentive to settle early. See note 3.
94 Change of venue only could occur if the case were in federal court and then only under
the rules prescribed in 28 USC § 1404(a) (1994). See, for example, Van Dusen v Barrack, 376 US
612,616-24 (1964) (discussing ways in which a party may move a case due to improper venue).
Whether a court transfers a case under 28 USC § 1404(a) depends on many issues, generally
practical, such as where the parties prepared the contract, where the contracted duties took place
(or should have taken place), where evidence in the case is located, where the witnesses reside,
etc. 28 USC § 1391 (1994).
95 See Prejudgment and Postjudgment Interest § 1 (cited in note 16).Though the difference
between New York's prejudgment interest rate (9 percent) and Connecticut's prejudgment in-
terest rate (up to 12 percent) is not large, it is significant. Furthermore, the difference could be as
high as 15 percent, depending on the states involved. See text accompanying notes 21 and 22.
96 Applying another state's prejudgment interest rule may not subvert parties' intentions
because if they truly relied on a state's prejudgment interest rule, they would probably put it in
the contract. This assumption is true, however, only if the parties know that Connecticut courts
may not apply its prejudgment interest rule and the other potential possibilities, such as the
courts applying no prejudgment interest. It seems somewhat implausible that even sophisticated
parties will know the intricacies and possibilities of all the rules of the state they choose and the
potential pitfalls from differing prejudgment interest rules. The parties may not have contem-
plated that a court would not apply all of Connecticut's rules that would have a substantial bear-
ing to the outcome of a lawsuit.
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and Connecticut's procedural prejudgment rule.7 This pressure may
be very substantial if both Connecticut's procedual and New Jersey's
substantive rules are mandatory. This could lead to greater than opti-
mal settlement pressure, as well as to too much compensation for I.
The outcome also would thwart the intentions of the parties who, by
choosing New Jersey as the state under which the contract should be
decided, knew exactly what substantive statute (they thought) would
be applied to any possible case."' Of course, A could still try to change
the venue back to New Jersey.99
Finally, if II chose to bring the case in New York, uncertainty ex-
ists as to which forum would be superior. New York may choose to
apply only New Jersey's prejudgment rule because applying only one
prejudgment rule is what it normally does in its own cases. It may also
apply both prejudgment interest rules for many reasons: it thinks New
Jersey's interest rate is too low, or the case was too long, or the parties
should have settled, and so on. Regardless, A probably will feel more
pressure from the beginning of the case to settle because of this uncer-
tainty, which may very well change the outcome of the case.
'W
97 For a discussion of the possibility of two different state prejudgment interest rules apply-
ing to a single case, see Paine Webber, 579 A2d at 550-52 (explaining that if a court is applying
another state's law with a nondiscretionary substantive prejudgment interest rule and the court
also has a nondiscretionary procedural prejudgment interest rule, then "both [states'] statutes
could apply"). This could conceivably occur even if one or both rules were discretionary if the
court thought it had good cause. As Paine Webber notes, the application of two prejudgment
statutes is very possible. Id. Thus, there is a real possibility that a defendant will pay both a sub-
stantive and a procedural prejudgment interest, if a state with a procedural prejudgment interest
rule decides a case based on the substantive laws of a state with a substantive prejudgment inter-
est rule.
98 This seems like an even stronger case for disrupted intentions because the prejudgment
rule is substantive. Granted, if the parties were sophisticated businesses and knew of the pre-
judgment interest laws' state of disarray, then they may have taken into consideration the fact
that a court may adjudicate their case in a state that characterized their prejudgment interest as
procedural, which could lead to the defendant having to pay double interest or feeling excessive
settlement pressure. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that even two sophisticated businesses could
consider all the different states in which a suit could be brought against them and all the differ-
ent laws which may be different or differently applied. This bad result is exactly why parties in-
clude a choice-of-law provision.
99 See note 95 for change of venue rules.
100 As shown in this example, legislatures and courts intend prejudgment interest rules to
enhance settlement pressure and be "outcome-determinative," even though they are often con-
sidered procedural. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained, quoting the Civil Procedure
Rules Committee, "Statistics show that ... [t]hirty-eight percent [of cases] are settled without go-
ing to trial ... but in too many cases meaningful negotiations commence only after a trial date is
fixed or on the courthouse steps or in the courtroom, thus leading to delay in the disposition of
cases and congestion in the courts. [A system without prejudgment interest] provides no incen-
tive for early settlement. [There is currently] no compensation to the successful plaintiff and no
sanction against the defendant for the long delay between commencement of the action and the
trial." Laudenberger v Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa 52, 436 A2d 147, 150-51
(1981), citing 8 Pa Bulletin 2668 (1978).
[69:705
Prejudgment Interest in Choice-of-Law Disputes
IV. SOLUTION: DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY TO
HORIZONTAL UNIFORMITY
Governmental interest analysis, coupled with a focused, static
view of prejudgment interest, has not only led to horizontal disuni-
formity-it has not fulfilled its own procedural aims. A dynamic ap-
proach, by contrast, however, would both fulfill the procedural pur-
poses of prejudgment interest and create more horizontal uniformity,
leading to less forum shopping.
A. The Traditional Approach: Static Reading of Purpose and the
Procedural Conundrum
Ever since Brainerd Currie introduced governmental interest
analysis into choice-of-law situations,O' state legislatures and courts
have deemphasized predictability and forum shopping prevention
goals in favor of the more important policy objectives of state gov-
ernments.' However, if governmental interest analysis undermines
predictability and introduces arbitrariness and inconsistency into the
legal system, then it also undermines the rule of law itself for the rule
of law is based on nonarbitrariness."3
A static view of governmental interest and a focus on the specific
case at hand have led state courts to characterize their prejudgment
interest rules as procedural. 10' The stated purposes of states that char-
acterize their prejudgment interest rules as procedural include "un-
clogging the judicial machinery," "encourag[ing] settlement," and "re-
ducing the number of cases actually going to trial."' ' These statutes
usually have features of prejudgment interest law that distinctively
advance the interests of judicial economy rather than victim compen-
sation. This static view of prejudgment interest, intended for judicial
efficiency or to decrease the caseload, is likely to have just the oppo-
site effect in a multistate system where parties can choose the most
advantageous forum." Returning to the first example,'O' since the con-
101 See Brainerd Currie, Survival ofActions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict
of Laws, in Selected Essays in the Conflict of Laws 128,168 (Duke 1963) (proposing that forum
shopping may be "too broadly condemned" because if parties had more freedom to forum shop
then this may in fact lead to fewer conflicts of interest between states).
102 Id at 169 (suggesting that this approach would induce plaintiffs to minimize conflict and
"avoid the necessity of one state's striking down the interest of another").
103 See Ralph U.)Whitten, Commentary: Curing the Deficiencies of the Conflicts Revolution:
A Proposal for National Legislation on Choice of Law, Jurisdiction, and Judgments, 37 Wl-
lamette L Rev 259, 263-64 (2001) (discussing how governmental interest analysis has under-
mined the rule of law and proposing a national solution to choice-of-law issues).
104 See note 71.
105 See, for example, Zaretsky v Molecular Biosystems Inc, 464 NW2d 546,550 (Minn App
1990).
106 It is increasingly probable that many states will have jurisdiction over most parties be-
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tract lists Connecticut as the state law under which the contract should
be adjudicated, 1l rationally will choose Connecticut in which to sue,
unless New York's procedural prejudgment interest rule is stronger. In
the modified example,'0 in which the contract lists New Jersey as the
state law under which the contract should be adjudicated, 1 rationally
will choose to sue in Connecticut, unless New York's procedural pre-
judgment interest rule is stronger.
Finally, if we add one more iteration and assume that the parties
wrote the contract to be adjudicated under New York law, then 1 ra-
tionally will choose either New York or Connecticut, depending on
which prejudgment interest statute provides more incentive to settle."'
Thus, procedural prejudgment interest rules such as those in Con-
necticut and New York, whose purpose is to reduce the number of
cases in the system, may actually increase the number of cases because
these states become magnets to plaintiffs. States that characterize
their prejudgment interest statutes as substantive, such as New Jersey,
should receive fewer cases and thus lower their caseloads-4he exact
scenario that states with procedural prejudgment interest characteri-
zations were trying to create.
The total number of cases in states with procedural prejudgment
interest rules may not increase due to forum shopping if all of the "ex-
tra" cases settle. This, however, seems unrealistic. Even if the cases did
settle, procedural states may still face a dramatic increase in lower
courts' workloads becau'se judges or other administrative staff are of-
ten involved in settlement agreements.
Defendants have just as much interest in selecting the proper fo-
rum and thus may try to locate the trial in a similarly favorable state.
The rules governing venue changes, however, are much stricter and
permission for such switches is much more difficult to obtain. Further,
our court system has a history of and preference for allowing a plain-
tiff to choose whatever forum best suits her, as long as the forum has
personal jurisdiction.
If state courts take a static view when they interpret the purposes
of their prejudgment interest statutes and only apply the governmen-
tal interest analysis to the case at hand, they are likely to miss the true
effects of prejudgment interest. This static view of prejudgment inter-
est may undermine the stated procedural purposes for prejudgment
interest. Different state characterizations of prejudgment interest lead
cause of the mobility of today's society and the interstate, if not international, nature of many
businesses.
107 See text accompanying notes 90-96.
108 See text accompanying notes 97-99.
109 In fact, rI probably will choose Connecticut because of the possibility of receiving both a
procedural and substantive prejudgment interest award.
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to disuniformity among the states and exacerbate both unpredictabil-
ity and forum shopping, 0 which may in turn lead to an increase in a
state's caseload and a decrease in judicial efficiency. Thus, a state try-
ing to protect itself by characterizing its prejudgment interest rule as
procedural may impede its own purposes."'
B. Dynamic Reading of Purpose: Prejudgment Interest Rule as a
Substantive Rule in Choice-of-Law Situations
The solution to this conundrum is not for a judge to defy the pur-
poses of her state's prejudgment interest rule, but to recognize its pro-
cedural purpose statically and dynamically. A judge must realize that
legislatures and courts established prejudgment interest for the dy-
namic efficiency and case control of the whole system, not solely for
the case at hand.
If the purposes of prejudgment interest is to decrease caseloads,
then this purpose is by its nature applicable to the whole system (that
is, dynamic) and not just the case at hand. Courts cannot fulfill these
purposes by detaching themselves from the judicial system and focus-
ing on the case before them. Thus, when a judge looks at one case and
decides whether prejudgment interest attaches, the judge must con-
sider the implications of the decision for the entire judicial system. A
court can best realize the dynamic purposes of procedural prejudg-
ment interest by (1) applying its own prejudgment interest rule,
whether procedural or substantive, in domestically controlled cases,
(2) applying the prejudgment interest rule of the state law selected in
a contract, and (3) applying the prejudgment interest rule of the state
chosen by the state's choice-of-law determination in all other cases.
This is especially true when there is a large discrepancy in states' pre-
judgment interest rules, because a party has more incentive to forum
shop when there is a significant discrepancy between the forum state's
own prejudgment interest rule and the prejudgment interest rule of
the state under whose law the case is being adjudicated.
Once a state that characterizes its prejudgment rules as proce-
dural has established a reputation for applying prejudgment interest
as if it were substantive, plaintiffs and defendants will not have incen-
tives to forum shop that state, and the caseload subsequently should
110 See Whitten, 37 Willamette L Rev at 263-78 (cited in note 103) (discussing the various
approaches states have taken to conflict of laws and concluding that every approach allowed
enough manipulation by states so as to create disuniformity even though states appeared to
adopt the rule uniformly).
111 States impede their own procedural purposes due to the dynamic effects of prejudgment
interest only in choice-of-law situations. A state with a procedural prejudgment interest statute
very well may lower its total caseload and increase judicial efficiency in the domestic realm. This
would only occur if the effect on domestic cases is larger than the increase from forum shopping.
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fall. This solution does not just acknowledge governmental interest
analysis, but actually exalts it by furthering the state's interest while
also having a beneficial effect on uniformity, predictability, and forum
shopping. It accomplishes both a state's goal of limiting its caseload
and the Erie goals of limiting forum shopping and uncertainty. The so-
lution should also not upset parties' expectations and will make con-
tracting more efficient.'12
Additionally, a dynamic reading of prejudgment interest also
would not infringe excessively on states' prerogative to make their
own procedural rules and it should have favorable judicial efficiency
effects on state court systems. First, this solution would leave intact
our federalist system, allowing states to promulgate whatever pre-
judgment interest rules they desire. A judicial determination that pre-
judgment interest rules are substantive for choice-of-law decisions will
not disrupt a state's flexibility to classify prejudgment interest rules as
procedural or substantive for domestic cases. Divergence among states
as to rates and the situations in which prejudgment interest applies
will still exist, but this type of diversity is either the benefit of or the
price to be paid for our multi-state system. Second, this judicial gap-
filling in choice-of-law situations would only limit the application of
prejudgment interest rules in cases in which another state law applies,
thus decreasing judicial caseload by limiting forum shopping. This so-
lution would not, of course, prevent all forum shopping, but it would
eliminate one of the sources. Third, parties will still feel some settle-
ment pressure from prejudgment interest in cases adjudicated under
another state's laws, because all states have prejudgment interest rules.
Finally, this solution would remove any need for national legislative
solutions, which have been proposed" 3
One may worry that this proposal would lessen defendants' pres-
sure to settle and limit a state's choice to characterize its prejudgment
rules as procedural. This proposal admittedly would lessen a defen-
dant's settlement pressure, but generally only in those situations in
which a plaintiff forum shopped into a state that characterizes its pre-
judgment interest rule as procedural. If the state held that its pre-
judgment interest rule should follow the substantive law in choice-of-
law cases, then the plaintiff would not have forum shopped into that
state initially and the state need not worry about any extra settlement
pressure. The second concern is not necessarily true. A holding that
prejudgment interest follows the substantive law in choice-of-law
112 See the related discussion in O'Hara and Ribstein, 67 U Chi L Rev at 1184-97 (cited in
note 41) (discussing how choice-of-law decisions in courts should promote efficiency by uphold-
ing parties' expectations).
113 See, for example, Whitten, 37 Willamette L Rev at 285-90 (cited in note 103) (discussing
proposals for "uniform national conflicts rules in the multistate commercial context").
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situations could be limited to the choice-of-law subset of situations.
Moreover, simply because procedural matters generally are governed
by the law of the forum state does not mean that they all must be.'11 A
state could determine that procedural prejudgment interest follows
the substantive state in choice-of-law cases, but remains a procedural
rule. This characterization is within the state's prerogative,"' and it
would allow courts to keep the benefits from characterizing their rules
as procedural, such as retroactivity or Supreme Court authorship. '
CONCLUSION
States enact prejudgment interest statutes for both substantive
and procedural justifications: (1) achieving full compensation of the
aggrieved plaintiff and (2) improving judicial efficiency by encourag-
ing settlements and thereby reducing a court's caseload. In the choice-
of-law context, however, state courts differ as to which rationale
dominates. This leads to horizontal disuniformity and forum shopping
between states. In addition, the Supreme Court's ruling in Klaxon held
that federal courts must use choice-of-law decisions from the states in
which they sit, which increased vertical uniformity but simply switched
forum shopping between state and federal courts sitting in the same
state to shopping between courts in different states. The potentially
large awards courts give under prejudgment interest rules generate in-
creased pressure on defendants to settle. Ironically, the forum shop-
ping created by the divergence in interpretation of prejudgment inter-
est ends up hurting those states that focus on the procedural aspects
of caseload control and judicial efficiency because plaintiffs forum
shop into their court system.
This Comment offers a consistent way to end forum shopping and
unequal treatment, while maintaining a state's control over its proce-
dural rules. Courts should interpret prejudgment interest rules dy-
namically, as opposed to statically, or on a case-by-case basis. A dy-
namic interpretation and the subsequent ruling that prejudgment in-
terest follow the substantive law, if only for choice-of-law decisions,
will further the procedural goal of increasing judicial efficiency by
114 Zaretsky v Molecular Biosystems Inc, 464 NW2d 546,548 (Minn App 1990) (stating that
choice-of-law determinations are made on an issue-by-issue basis depending on whether the law
is more procedural or substantive).
115 See, for example, Davis v Furlong, 328 NWV2d 150,153 (Minn 1983) ("In Minnesota, the
well-settled rule is that matters of procedure and remedies are governed by the law of the fo-
rum").
116 State supreme courts generally can only prescribe procedural rules. See, for example Pa
Const Art V, § 10(c) (stating that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is empowered to "prescribe
general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts ... if such rules are con-
sistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of
any litigant").
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lessening the caseload. Plaintiffs then will have no prejudgment inter-
est incentive to forum shop into any particular state. For potential par-
ties, this proposal will add more certainty to cases and fulfill parties'
expectations. For the state, this dynamic characterization of proce-
dural prejudgment interest rules will lead to less forum shipping and
less horizontal disuniformity, and will also fulfill the governmental in-
terest in having the prejudgment interest rule.
